The Creation of an Ancient Minority Nationality: Koguryo in Chinese Historiography

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June 2002

Anyone familiar with Korean history will be likewise familiar with the integral role of the ancient state of Koguryo in Korean historiography. In may come as a surprise to some readers that over the past decade a heated debate has engaged the attention of many Korean and Chinese scholars, the point of contention being whether modern Koreans or modern Chinese hold the rightful claim to Koguryo’s heritage. On one level such a conflict might have been expected since Koguryo was a state that controlled territories on both sides of the current Yalu River border between North Korea and the People’s Republic of China. And indeed this territorial consideration lies very close to the heart of the debate, though neither party seems willing to acknowledge this openly. In the present paper, however, I will argue that the debate was an inevitable consequence of the twentieth century tendency, among both Chinese and Korean scholars, to reconceptualize past interregional relations in order to bring the perceived form of pre-modern East Asian states into conceptual alignment with that of the modern nation-state. In the study below I will focus almost exclusively on the treatment of Koguryo in modern Chinese historiography, deferring a detailed study of the place of Koguryo in modern Korean nationalism to a later project.

Koguryo in Traditional Historiography

The Koguryo state at its peak controlled vast territories encompassing the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the eastern and southern halves respectively of the modern Chinese provinces of Liaoning and Jilin. During the final half century of its long existence (traditionally 37 b.c. to 668), Koguryo was engaged in continuous warfare with the Chinese Tang dynasty to its west and the peninsular states of Paekche and Silla to its south. Even before the fall of Koguryo in 668 to the allied armies of Tang and Silla, bids for possession of its mantle of legitimacy had already appeared. During what are now referred to as the Unification Wars, Tang and Silla propaganda began to refer to the peninsular states as the Three Kingdoms of the East (haedong samguk), or sometimes as the Three Han. This appears to have been a conscious effort to draw a parallel between the three peninsular states and the Three Kingdoms of third century China, which fought one another in an attempt to restore the “natural” unity that had existed under the previous dynasty of Han. By drawing on this historical precedent, Silla and Tang could justify their aggressions against Paekche and Koguryo as a righteous effort to restore a unity, which in the case of the peninsular states is not likely ever to have existed.
After the fall of Koguryo and the subsequent withdrawal of the Tang occupation forces, Silla managed to extend its control over the former lands of Paekche, but it was able to secure only the southernmost periphery of Koguryo’s former territories. By the end of the seventh century most of the former lands of Koguryo north of the Taedong River had become the de facto possession of the newly emergent state of Parhae. Both Silla and Parhae continued to claim the Koguryo heritage—Silla as a would-be unifier and Parhae as a self-proclaimed political heir—until the fall of both states in the early tenth century. The founder of the Koryo state that succeeded Silla drew from Koguryo the name of his state, but he and his polity were clearly derived from Silla. Nevertheless, Koryo’s claim to the Koguryo heritage carried some respectable weight. When the Khitan commander Xiao Hengde demanded in 993 that Koryo hand over territory that had formerly belonged to Koguryo, the Koryo commander So Hui is said to have responded with such a convincing argument for Koryo’s right to Koguryo lands that the Khitan quietly backed down. Although the twelfth century saw some debate within the Koryo capital with regard to whether Koryo was properly a state of Koguryo descent or one of Silla descent, with the publication in 1145 of the Samguk sagi, Koguryo became permanently lodged in the historiographic orthodoxy of peninsular states as one of the ancient Three Kingdoms.

Chinese claims to territories occupied by Koguryo do appear sporadically in history texts of the Tang dynasty, but they are nearly always asserted as propaganda meant to justify Tang’s military expeditions against Koguryo. Tang’s planned conquest of Koguryo was at times portrayed as a mission to restore Chinese control over the territories of its former commanderies of Liaodong and Lelang, which had centuries ago fallen under Koguryo control. After the collapse of Koguryo in 668, Tang moved quickly to establish the Andong Protectorate in the Koguryo capital city of P’yongyang, but local resistance, actively encouraged by Silla, soon forced the protectorate to withdraw to Liaodong. After the failure of the protectorate to assert Tang control over Koguryo’s peninsular territories, and Parhae’s subsequent success in consolidating those territories under its own administration, Tang formally relinquished to Silla in 735 all lands south of the Taedong River. This act constituted nothing more than a formal acknowledgement of what for Tang had already long been a regrettable reality. From this time and until the twentieth century, no Chinese regime originating in the Central Plains of China had asserted a serious claim for possession of the Koguryo heritage or for a right to its territories based on any kind of perceived integration of Koguryo within ancient China. It is therefore surprising that by the end of the twentieth century Chinese scholars would be arguing passionately that Koguryo was, in fact, an integral and dependent component of the ancient Chinese state. I will argue below that this new Chinese concern with Koguryo coincides with and is one consequence of the advent of state nationalism in East Asia.

Nationalism and the Modern Chinese State

The sudden Chinese interest in the heritage of Koguryo may be seen as part of the most recent phase of a process that began in the late nineteenth century, when a new discourse of identity bound with conceptions of race and nationalism appeared in context with late-Qing reform and modernization programs. From the 1890s, reform advocates like Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and revolutionaries like Zhang Binglin (1868–1936) began to call for a unity of peoples, based on various conceptions of racial or ethnic nationalism,
in order to counter through the solidarity of a nation-state the imperialist threat represented by the Western powers and Japan. These new nationalist concepts, informed in part by contemporary western notions of race and social Darwinism and in part by a Qing tradition of lineal genealogical descent, are today popularly viewed as marking a radical and fundamental break with earlier traditional ways of conceiving the self and the state. The traditional conception of the state is typically seen as having been defined in terms of a culture of Confucian statecraft, wherein loyalties were directed toward the moral ruler (regardless of his ancestral affiliations) rather than toward a specific regime or people (Harrison 1969). The late Qing writers advocated a new arrangement wherein loyalties were instead directed toward the nation-state, which was defined variously as composed of one or more ethnic groups. James Townsend has referred to the academic formulation of this phenomenon as the “Culturalism to Nationalism thesis,” which he aptly describes as a generalization useful for analysis if not a well-defined paradigm (Townsend 1992).

The traditional model is based upon an assumed cultural superiority of the “Chinese” state, the rulers of which were expected and required to conform to a predefined moral code grounded in Confucian ethics. The possession and practice of this moral code is seen as the measure by which the Chinese and the uncultured barbarian were distinguished. However, barbarians could be transformed under the influence of the superior culture, and the degree to which they adopted Confucian norms determined their relative position in the idealized Chinese world order. Such positions include the totally uncultured peoples, with whom the Chinese states have no formal relations: outer tributaries who have adopted some degree of Chinese culture and with whom diplomatic interchange is possible: more highly cultured inner tributaries who engage China as closely affiliated but independent polities: and those former tributaries who have come to be directly administered by the Chinese state (Harrell 1999). States and peoples occupying any of the positions of this idealized schema may shift to another position, though the ultimate goal from the Chinese perspective is for all to tend toward full integration with the Chinese state. There were aberrations to this assimilationist model, of course, for in some instances barbarian groups invaded China and established their own dynasties, but they are said to have been successful only because they governed China in accordance with the Confucian moral code? in other words, they did not have to be Chinese to conquer China, but they had to become Chinese to rule China.

Traditional conceptions of what and who was “Chinese” were thus fluid to an extent, though it is important to point out that such concerns as we have discussed them were limited to a small, educated elite class. Although the culturalist argument emphasizes the identification of self and state with moral statecraft, this does not of necessity preclude the co-existence of forms of ethnic consciousness or nationalism. Indeed, some of the Manchu conquerors of China appear to have taken rudimentary steps toward a formulaic expression of their own ethnic identity by the end of the eighteenth century. During the Qianlong reign this expression was institutionalized in the court-commissioned Manzhou yuanliu kao (Studies of Manchu Origins), compiled by scholars under the direction of Agui and Yu Minzhong. In this work the Manchu system of clan descent is projected onto a genealogy of historical peoples and states of the Manchuria region, creating a political and ethnic pedigree stretching back to remote antiquity. The intent behind this project was to give formal expression to Qianlong’s conceptions of Manchu identity, thereby strengthening his own authority and imparting a sense of identity to those
Manchus for whom the distinction between Manchu and Han was no longer clear (Crossley 1987).

The first section of the *Manzhou yuanliu kao* traces a conceptualized Manchu ancestral lineage from the ancient Sushen of three millennia ago to the Jianzhou Jurchen of the Ming period, from whose midst the first groups identifying themselves as Manchus arose. This imagined pedigree with its collateral branches includes Puyo and Yilou, various Malgal groups, Parhae (Bohai), and the Wanyan Jurchen. Also included are the Samhan polities, Silla, and Paekche?Koguryo is conspicuously absent in this perceived lineage. The terminology employed to illustrate the linkages among these historical groups mimics in part that used in discussing clan descent. While loosely federated peoples who had yet to build states are identified with the ambiguous term *bu*, sometimes rendered as tribe, state-level polities are identified with the term *zu*, a term associated with genealogical (clan) descent (Crossley 1987, 767). Implicit in this new and imperfectly conceived framework is an outline of ethnic identity based on consanguinity and lineal descent. While its original goal of preventing the loss of Manchu identity ultimately failed, it did contribute a terminological and conceptual foundation upon which later nationalist thinkers could build.

When the Qing empire began to break apart under the pressures exerted by foreign powers, its scholars forged theories to explain the causes behind the fragmentation of their worldview. Especially prominent were the concepts of social Darwinism and the organic society, first introduced to China by Yan Fu (1854–1921) through his translations of Spencer and Huxley. Western notions of race were simultaneously introduced to China through the activities of Christian missionaries (Dikotter 1992, 55–56). Reformist scholars like Yan and Kang Youwei came to describe the Chinese dilemma as a struggle between their own Yellow Race (*huangzhong*), which included both Han and Manchus, against the White Race (*baizhong*). Yan warned his readers that racial extinction (*miezhong*) was a likely consequence of failure to rise as a race against the White menace (Dikotter 1992, 75). Later, the revolutionist Zhang Binglin (1869–1936), who needed to distinguish between Manchu people and Han people in order to further his anti-Manchu agenda, appropriated the Qing terminology of lineage and descent and created the concept of a Han race (*Hanzu*), which stood distinct from the Manchu race (*Manzu*) (Chow 1997; Dikotter 1992, 28–29). Zhang’s *Hanzu* constituted a race-lineage of people who, he imagined, were consanguineous by virtue of their common descent from the mythical Yellow Emperor (Huangdi) (Chow 1997, 40).

From the late 1890s much political discourse in China revolved around the classification of peoples using various modes of differentiation, and until the collapse of Qing in 1911 there was continued debate between reformists and revolutionists with regard to the specific shape and constitution of the future Chinese state. Both parties were agreed that this must take the form of a modern nation-state, but there was less accord on the subject of how the nation was to be defined. Zhang Binglin envisioned an exclusionary Chinese state populated by the Han “race” alone. Other major groups, such as the Manchus, would be given autonomy within their own territories outside of China, which naturally meant a China greatly reduced in territorial scope (Chow 1997, 42–43). The reformist Liang Qichao (1873–1929), on the other hand, emphasized shared characteristics of the various yellow races of the Qing empire and called for a union of all of those races within a new Chinese nation, albeit with the Han majority in the paramount position (Levenson 1967, 160–162; Dikotter 1992, 86–87). Liang described his pluralistic
vision as a great nationalism, in contrast with the minor nationalism advocated by Zhang
and other revolutionists. While revolutionists and reformists alike based their nationalist
visions upon the new racial discourse, their differences in opinion regarding the Manchus
meant that the Han–Manchu relationship formed the pivot around which much of the racial
debate revolved. With the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, however, nationalist
discussion inevitably turned to a consideration of all “non-Han” peoples and their place
within the new Chinese republic.

The Multi-national Republic of China

With the Manchu problem relegated to minor importance and attention directed
increasingly toward western economic imperialism, nationalists were forced to consider
the problem of the nation in broader terms. Would China become a territorially reduced
state of a single nationality, or would it also encompass some of the other “races” that
had comprised the Qing empire? The solution offered by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was a
multi-national republic of five races. Sun’s concept of China was one of an artificially
formed state (guojia) created and populated by the Chinese (Han) lineage–race (minzu).
In his view, China had been a single polity formed by a single race since the Qin
unification. The Republic of China, however, was to be composed of five races, of which
the Han race was prime and core. However, Sun also spoke of the historically
demonstrated effectiveness of the Chinese cultural example in assimilating other peoples,
including conquerors like the Mongols and Manchus. Although Sun’s republic was to be
a multi-national state, by the 1920s his intention was to forge a greater solidarity of
people by removing apparent racial distinctions through a process of assimilation
(tonghua), whereby the non-Han peoples would come to resemble and behave like the
Han (Sun 1925). Under Chiang Kai-shek this policy became symbolically implicit in the
change of the state flag in 1928 from the standard of five stripes, representing each of
the five nationalities, to that bearing only the white sun of the Republic.

Even after Chiang captured North China in 1928, the Republic’s policy continued to
stress its composite character with an emphasis on assimilation, though in practice
Chiang’s government rarely showed respect for the wishes of its minority groups, some
of which, like the Mongols, were repeatedly denied any measure of autonomy within the
Republic. The communists under Mao Zedong were at the same time preaching a minority
policy, adopted from the Soviet model, that promised not only self-determination for
minority groups within the Chinese state, but even guaranteed the right of secession.
These policies were directed toward the larger minority groups who occupied the
expansive frontier territories that marked most of the Republic’s claimed borders, but
there appears to have been little effort (beyond the propaganda programs mentioned
above) before the 1930s to provide rigorous historical justification for the inclusion of
those peoples and their lands in the new Chinese state. This is probably due to the fact
that consolidation of Han-populated China was of greatest concern until 1928 given the
exigency of the day, the loose, racially-based theoretical claims were probably deemed
sufficient for the Republic’s immediate purposes of consolidation and control. It was not
until the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 that the Republic was faced suddenly with
the task of justifying its claim on Manchuria and began to reconsider in some detail the
history of that region and its peoples.
Some Chinese scholars were troubled by propaganda of the 1920s that portrayed a monolithic and homogenous Chinese state with a long history of political unity. By 1926 Gu Jiegang (1895–1980) had argued that the various nationalities of the Republic were not kindred descendents of the Yellow Emperor, nor even did the Han Chinese themselves have a single origin, nor were the various nationalities such as the ancestors of the Manchus integrated into a Chinese political unit in antiquity. This argument contrasted sharply with Chiang Kai-shek’s rhetoric, wherein a claimed common descent from the Yellow Emperor underlay the slogan of “Five Races in Harmony” (wuzu gonghe). Gu felt that the Republican propaganda machine would do well to abandon this simplistic ideology in favor of a more realistic program that emphasized the historical contributions non-Han peoples had made to a developing Han Chinese culture. In the 1930s Gu described Chinese culture as a composite that by itself tended toward stagnation, but which had periodically been infused with new vigor by interchange with neighboring non-Han peoples (Schneider 1971, 258–272).

Under the influence of Gu and his “Doubting Antiquity” school, Fu Sinian (1896–1950) developed his theory of plural origins in the formation of the Chinese people. Fu’s studies at Berlin University led him to see the movement of ethnic groups as the primary element of history, and he saw Chinese history as the story of multiple, contending nationalities (minzu). Fu believed that the ancient Shang dynasty represented an ethnic group that had originated in Manchuria, and in his Yi–Hua dongxi shuo, originally published in 1935, he compared the customs of ancient peoples of Manchuria, such as the Puyo and Koguryo, to those of the Eastern Yi groups of the Shandong region (Fu 1980; Wang 2000, 109–114). In this scenario, Fu highlighted the role of Manchurian states and peoples in the formation of a constantly evolving Chinese culture. The emphasis here was not on the Chinese origins of those non-Han peoples, but rather on their own contributions to the development of “China”.

After the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931, and especially following the establishment of the puppet Manchukuo state in 1932, some Chinese scholars turned their efforts toward substantiating China’s historical claim to Manchuria. The first Chinese scholarly treatment of Manchuria was Fu Sinian’s Dongbei shigang, published in 1932. In this work, Fu draws on arguments based in history, archaeology, and mythology to produce a scientific refutation of the Japanese claims denying China’s historical relationship with Manchuria. The work is largely a political statement, an English abstract of which was penned by the archaeologist Li Ji and submitted to the Lytton Commission investigating the Manchuria Problem (Li 1932). Fu claims that the nationalities (minzu) of southern Manchuria, whom he defines in terms of commonality in language and culture, have long been identical to the people of northern China. He invokes his Manchurian–origins theory for the Shang to illustrate first the contributions made by ancient Manchurian peoples to Chinese culture. He then claims that upon the fall of Shang some of those (now culturally advanced) peoples returned to Manchuria (Fu 1932, 112). In this regard, Fu places special emphasis on the Jizi legend and his purported contributions to the culture of southern Manchuria and northern Korea. Fu also sees Jizi’s flight to Old Choson as marking the beginning of “Chinese” political control over southern Manchuria and Korea.

One of Fu’s more interesting innovations is his suggestion that the ruling strata of Puyo and Koguryo were ethnically distinct from those they ruled. He identified the base population as the Yemaek, whom he saw as identical to the historical Maek (Ch. Mo)
people, who originated in north China (Hebei) and spread out to the northeast when Shang collapsed. The ruling class of Puyo and Koguryo, however, were refugees, most likely a mixture of Donghu nomads and agrarian groups from north China. The Samhan people in southern Korea were, by contrast, a motley combination of indigenous linguistic groups, into which some Yemaek and Chinese Han immigrants from the commandery of Lelang had been introduced (Fu 1932, 112–115, 122–126). Fu stops short of claiming that modern Korean represents a linguistic development from the Samhan language of Silla rather than from the Yemaek language of Koguryo, but he does suggest that the Koryo state was a political development from Silla rather than Koguryo (Fu 1932, 125). Fu’s primary linguistic objective is to refute Japanese linguistic theory by differentiating the related “Yemaek” languages of Puyo, Koguryo, Okcho, and Tongye from the “Tungusic” languages of the Yilou and their descendents in northern Manchuria. His concern, in other words, was with establishing the cultural and linguistic links between populations in northern China and those in southern Manchuria and northern Korea.

Dongbei shigang drew harsh criticism from Fu’s opponents in China, who pointed out its many historical inaccuracies and its failure to consider unequivocal historical evidence that contradicts some of Fu’s arguments, such as his claim that southern Manchuria and Korea had long been directly administered provinces of Chinese states (Wang 2000, 149–152). Nevertheless, the work, despite its shortcomings, nicely illustrates the convergence of a developing racial theory, a concern with the history of East Asia rather than China alone (largely a response to Japan’s toyoshi program), and a tendency to define the limits of early Chinese states in terms of the modern nation–state. Fu’s use of language and culture as a defining measure of the ethnicity of ancient peoples would influence his contemporaries and his successors, many of whom continue to arrange historical groups according to such criteria. In Fu’s arrangement, Puyo and Koguryo share close cultural relations with a very broadly defined ancient Chinese state, first by virtue of their purported cultural connections with the Shang, and secondly as a factor of their supposed political subordination to Chinese states. Later peninsular states, in this scheme, were but integral components of the greater Chinese state, albeit highly developed ones.

An interesting variation of this treatment of peninsular states appears in the 1933 Zhongguo minzu shi of Lu Simian (1884–1957), who traces twelve different nationalities and races that appear in Chinese histories to what he believed to be their modern day descendents. Of the various nationalities (minzu) bordering Han China, which are defined in terms of common language, customs, and culture, the Maek are by far the most civilized in Lu’s view. Lu saw the Maek, also called Yemaek, as having originated in the land of Old Choson located in Liaoning, Rehe, and Hebei. With the Yan expansion of the early third century B.C., the Maek were pressed out of their homeland. Those who withdrew northward established the state of Puyo, while those who went south established Koguryo and Paekche, and those who did not found states became known as the Okcho and Tongye (Lu 1989).

Like Fu Sinian, Lu claimed that all of the Maek peoples were strongly influenced by Jizi and Shang culture, and he goes to some pains to demonstrate a cultural connection between Puyo and Shang. Unlike Fu, he states explicitly that the Maek developed into the later peninsular states and became the modern Koreans, though they repeatedly received the strong influence of Chinese culture. Also unlike Fu Sinian, Lu does not claim that Chinese states ever exercised real political control over the peninsular states and Koguryo except for the brief tenure of the Andong Protectorate (Lu 1989, 131–148). Lu’s
objective seems to have been the delineation of the multi-national Chinese state as it
might be projected into the past, though, as the case of the Maek illustrates, Lu did not
insist that the ancestors of the minority nationalities of Republican China must necessarily
have been a politically integrated component of any theoretical Chinese corporate polity
of the remote past, though he does emphasize the civilizing influence of Han culture and
its assimilating effect.

While numerous Chinese studies after 1931 focused attention on the history of Manchuria,
which by then was invariably referred to as the Northeast (Dongbei), none was as
comprehensive in its scope as the Dongbei tongshi of Jin Yufu (1887–1962). While this
work was conceptually a product of the intellectual tendencies of its year, its specific form
and perspective were very much shaped by the extraordinary experiences of its author. A
native of Liaoyang in the modern province of Liaoning, Jin Yufu was educated at Beijing
University, from which he graduated in 1916 with a degree in literature. After graduation,
Jin returned to Manchuria and served in several government offices, mostly in Fengtian
(Shenyang), and during his years of service he began to study the history of his home
region. In 1931, however, Japanese forces seized Manchuria, and Jin was taken prisoner.
After refusing several offices offered to him under the puppet government of Manchukuo,
Jin was taken to Tokyo, where he remained for several years immersed in the study of
Manchurian history. In 1936 he managed to return to China and, with the help of several
scholars including Fu Sinian, secured a position at Central University in Nanjing.

During his years in Tokyo, Jin was dismayed to find there a thriving center of scholarship
on Manchuria, while no such effort to study the history of the Manchurian region had been
undertaken in China. He deplored the fact that while some noteworthy works on the region
had appeared in China, such as the works of Fu Sinian and Lu Simian, none of them
provided comprehensive treatment of the history of what was then known in China as the
Northeast (Jin 1976, 1:1B–2A). Jin made it his primary task upon returning to China to
rectify this discrepancy, and his Dongbei tongshi was the result. He began work on his
comprehensive history of the Northeast almost immediately upon his return. Most of the
work appears to have been written from 1936 to 1939, and in 1941 the finished product
appeared in publication.

In keeping with the politically sensitive intellectual milieu of the time, Jin opens his work
with the declaration that the history of the Northeast is nothing more than one part of the
history of China (guoshi) (1:2A). He maintains that the basic element of history is the
nationality (minzu) rather than the state (guojia), and he notes that a state may
encompass multiple nationalities, while a single nationality may span multiple states. For
Jin, the history of the Northeast is precisely the history of its nationalities. “The
Northeast” is itself defined primarily in terms of its nationalities and secondarily in terms
of the territories occupied by those nationalities. The territorial extent of the Northeast
therefore shifted through time as the various nationalities expanded and contracted, and
at times the Northeast included parts of the Korean peninsula. Throughout time the
nationalities of the Northeast always represented an integral part of the greater Chinese
country (zhonghua minzu) (1:15B–25B). Jin conceived of the history of the Northeast as a
complex and ever changing process defined by the movements of and competition
among its various nationalities. He periodized the history of the Northeast into six phases
on this basis, using both the relative strength and weakness of the Han presence as well
as the changing permutations among the indigenous nationalities as the criteria for
delimiting historical eras (1:25B–27B).
While Jin recognized the existence in his day of three nationalities in the Northeast—Han, Manchu, and Mongol—he believed that anciently there had been four primary nationalities, which he described in terms of ancestral lineages (zu). The first were the Han, who had immigrated to the Northeast in several waves from the Central Plains of China. Jin refutes the claims of Japanese scholars that the first Han entered the Northeast with the Yan expansion in the third century B.C. He cites the case of Jizi as one earlier historical precedent for Han immigration, but he further points to recent archaeological discoveries as evidence that still earlier Han movements might have occurred in Neolithic times (2:1A–1B). The other three nationalities of the Northeast were, unlike the Han, indigenes. They were the Sushen nationality, represented historically by the Yilou, Jurchen, and Manchus among others; the Donghu nationality, whose many descendents included the Xianbei, Khitan, and Mongols; and the Puyo nationality, who established the states of Puyo, Koguryo, and Paekche (1:15B–20B). Jin insists that the three indigenous nationalities were culturally indistinct from the Han living in the Northeast, and at times he seems to imply that these groups were actually conscious of being part of the greater Chinese nation. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this complex problem, and Jin’s conception of this Chinese nation remains rather vague throughout his work.

Jin’s Puyo nationality is essentially the same as the Maek, or Yemaek, nationality described in the works of Fu Sinian and Lu Simian, but Jin does not connect them with Old Choson, which he sees as having been a Han polity. While Koguryo and Paekche are both included as states established by the Puyo nationality, Jin notes that Paekche had very little connection with the Northeast and seems to have considered it as lying outside of the territorial extent of the Northeast (1:18A). Koguryo even appears in a sense to have left the fold of the Northeast when its capital was moved to Pyongyang, for Jin describes later Koguryo rulers as having turned their backs on their ethnic kin by withdrawing onto the peninsula and by lapsing into barbarism (4:25B). To illustrate the extinction of the Koguryo state, Jin is careful to differentiate between the state of Koguryo and the later peninsular state of Koryo, which he saw as having had distinct racial origins. To Jin, after the fall of Koguryo there were no more states established by the Puyo nationality.

While Jin is vague with regard to the relationship between Koguryo and modern Koreans, he is less obscure when he describes the fate of the Puyo nationality itself. He states explicitly that most of the peoples of the Puyo nationality moved southward into the Korean peninsula, where they eventually became the Korean nationality (Chaoxian minzu) (1:15B). He notes elsewhere that from the modern perspective, while the remnant of the Sushen and Donghu nationalities who were not assimilated by the Han are today represented by the modern Manchus and Mongols, the Puyo nationality have moved into the Korean peninsula and are no longer part of the Northeast (1:20B). Although he says also that the Puyo nationality who moved into the peninsula were all extinguished by Tang, it is clear from context that he is referring here to the states rather than to the people or nationality (5:1A).

Jin’s treatment of the Puyo nationality and its movements suggests that he considered modern Koreans to be an amalgamation of the Puyo nationality and the indigenous peoples of the peninsula. Regardless of whether Koguryo constituted part of ancient “China” or not (which it clearly did in Jin’s view), the historical model unambiguously describes the southward movement of the remnant Puyo nationality and its transformation or amalgamation into the Korean nationality. But leaving open the possibility of such a connection between the Puyo nationality and modern Koreans need not have troubled
Jin, given the political context of the late 1930s, the historical status of the now-stateless Korean people was of secondary importance to the matter of demonstrating China’s historical claim to Manchuria, which was one of Jin’s explicit concerns (though not the primary one) in writing the *Dongbei tongshi*.

By basing his definition of the Northeast on so mutable and imprecise a concept as the nationality lineage, Jin was bound to encounter contradictions and inconsistencies in his treatment of the history of the Northeast. His ambiguous treatment of the proper place of Paekche in his framework is one illustration of the conceptual pitfalls inherent in this approach. He seems to have been particularly vague with regard to the extent to which the territory of the Northeast extended into in the Korean peninsula during a given era. Jin was furthermore inexplicit on exactly why the nationalities of the Northeast should be considered part of a pre-modern “China”? he simply states this as a given at the head of his work. While Fu Sinian and Lu Simian cited various historical, cultural, and genealogical arguments for including some of the ancient “nationalities” of the Northeast within a hypothetical Chinese nation, Jin does not focus on this question. To Jin, the nationalities of the Northeast were not always politically subordinate to the pre-modern Han nation, nor was there a clear genealogical connection between the Han and the other nationalities. There is some suggestion that Jin considered culture as a criterion linking the nationalities to the Han-centered Chinese nation, one example being his description of a refractory Koguryo as having lapsed into barbarism, though even in this case severing or weakening the cultural link does not seem to have entirely released Koguryo from its place among the states of the Northeast.

Although Jin’s methodology clearly belongs to the strain of nationalist historiography then prevalent in China, which tended to focus on defining the Chinese nation-state through all historical periods and justifying the inclusion of non-Han peoples within the scope of that hypothetical polity, we may gain a better understanding of Jin’s concerns by taking note of the peculiarities of his historical project. Jin was writing a regional history rather than a history of China. While he undoubtedly felt the urgency in refuting Japanese claims regarding China’s historical relationship with Manchuria, his primary purpose in writing the *Dongbei tongshi* was to provide a comprehensive Chinese treatment of the history of the Northeast to counter Japan’s monopoly on Manchuria studies. In other words, Jin was primarily interested in the Northeast on its own merits? his goal was not to demonstrate its integration with China, which had already been addressed by others. Jin evidently first conceived of the Northeast in bounded geographical terms, after which he defined as nationalities of the Northeast those historical groups that he knew to have been active within that geographical space in historical times, and he naturally described those peoples in terms of racial lineages (nationalities) in keeping with the nationalist intellectual trends of the time. Nationalities of the Northeast were therefore any historical peoples or states that happened to have been significantly active within the geographical space that later came to be associated with Manchuria or the Northeast. This naturally created ambiguities when some of those peoples or polities were also active in or migrated to the Korean peninsula or elsewhere beyond the perceived territorial bounds of “Manchuria”.

This problem has been characterized as symptomatic of the modern reconceptualization of the Chinese state as described in the Culturalism to Nationalism thesis. In a recent study Stevan Harrell pointed out that scholarship has tended to overlook the importance of the periphery in the formulation of Chinese nationalism (Harrell
In the traditional schema the place of a people or polity within the Chinese world order was always relative and based on a gradient determined by their degree of civilization, or more specifically by the extent to which the peripheral polity or people had come to adopt Chinese culture, and especially their degree of acceptance of Confucian moral rule. The traditional periphery of the Chinese state was therefore fluid and soft, and the question of whether a given state or people “belonged to China” held little meaning beyond the degree of political control the emperor could exercise over it.

The modern conception of the nation-state in a world of nation-states, on the other hand, does not allow for the obscurity of soft boundaries, which unavoidably forces a fundamental reorientation with regard to China’s traditional notions of periphery. In this nationalist schema a people or polity is either within the nation or it is not. Although the modern Chinese nation might have taken the form of a single nation-state occupied by the newly conceived Han nationality, it was instead formulated as a multi-nation-state to include the various “non-Han” peoples of the periphery. Since rigid borders are a requisite of the modern nation, those non-Han nationalities became part of the new Chinese nationalist state by virtue of their having fallen within the territories claimed by the Republic of China as the result of war or treaty.

The problem that emerges in historical studies is, of course, that which results when the modern notion of the rigidly bounded Chinese multi-nation-state is projected backward and applied to historical periods before such an idea had been conceived. In other words, politically independent tributaries become seen retrospectively as nationalities integral to the pre-modern Chinese state. Some scholars such as Gu Jiegang preferred to see the Chinese nation as a genuinely new political order in contrast to imperial China, which in pre-modern times had not exercised real political control over all the peoples who occupied what are today China’s border regions. Other scholars such as Fu Sinian, perhaps prompted by the exigency of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, preferred to see ancient China as an inclusive nation-state little different from that of their own day. The state propagandists, always interested in fostering among the non-Han nationalities a sense of belonging to China, would naturally favor the historical view that emphasizes the long-term solidarity of a multi-national Chinese state. When stated in broad theoretical terms, an argument for a pre-modern multi-national China might seem prima facie convincing, but as Jin Yufu’s regional history of the Northeast demonstrates, conceptual inconsistencies creep in when historical detail must be dealt with.

Nationalist History in the People’s Republic

Although the Republic’s policy from the early 1920s promised minority nationalities self-determination and autonomy, in practice these rights were not protected, and steps taken to assimilate minorities through education often wound up antagonizing them instead (Dreyer 1976, 15–18). After 1949, however, minority policy under the People’s Republic of China received much greater attention, and from the state’s inception all nationalities were declared to be equal by law. The communists had adopted the Soviet minority policy in the 1920s, complete with a promise of minorities’ rights to autonomy and secession. However, by the late 1930s the right of secession had for various reasons been dropped from the policy, though the right of autonomy was
nominally implemented in 1952 with the establishment of autonomous regions. In practice, minority rights were not evenly protected, and during the enforced collectivization programs of the late 1950s, minority groups were severely persecuted. Again during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s, minorities were pressed to relinquish their own ethnic identities in favor of assimilation with the Han majority (Dreyer 1976; Heberer 1989).

It was not until the 1980s that minority’s rights were guaranteed and protected by law and their place in the state clearly defined. The PRC constitution of 1982 describes the state as a “unitary multinational state built up jointly by the people of all its nationalities,” and guarantees the equal rights of all nationalities. Specific rights of minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu) were further detailed in the Minority Region Autonomy Law of 1984. This law grants minorities a measure of administrative autonomy within the regions set up for them since 1952, though they are constrained by the same law to act within the confines of CCP policy, which emphasizes the interests of the state over those of its constituent components. In other words, the minorities within the designated autonomous regions have the freedom to govern themselves, to use their own languages, and to follow their own customs and religious beliefs to the extent that such acts do not challenge party policy. Since the policy of the CCP is not a constant and may in fact be redefined at any time, the Autonomy Law does not constitute a bilateral contract between the state and the minority nationalities, but it does grant those nationalities more latitude than they have previously experienced in post–imperial China. Current PRC propaganda emphasizes the state’s ethnic plurality, often visually depicting its more than fifty minority nationalities in exotic costume, with the benevolent figure of the Han majority, usually in western garb, protecting and educating them (Gladney 1994). This image of a civilizing Han influence in some ways recalls the Culturalist paradigm of imperial China discussed above, but it is recast in a Nationalist political framework. The peoples’ loyalty is to be directed to the state and the party, but the Han majority must take on the added responsibility of protecting and educating the minorities.

The binding, intimate relationship between the Han and the minorities appears also as a recurring motif in historical studies, though such expressions rarely go beyond a mere formulaic statement in academic papers. Until recently studies on the history or archaeology of the Northeast published in academic or popular journals in the PRC have tended to focus on their immediate academic concerns rather than dwelling on justifying China’s claim to the Northeast. This is primarily due to the fact that since 1949, except for some violent border disputes with the Soviet Union, there has been no challenge to the PRC territorial claim to the three provinces of the Northeast. Notably, however, 1949 also marks the first time that any Chinese government based in the Central Plains has exercised lasting direct control over any Manchurian lands beyond the old Liaodong frontier. As a result of this relative territorial security, until the 1980s most academic studies of the Northeast omitted statements justifying China’s historical rights to the Northeast, and when they did appear, they were typically nothing more than the same stock slogans held over from pre–1949 years. Most historians in the Northeast have followed the framework of regional history laid down by Jin Yufu, who has come to be revered as the doyen of historical studies of the Northeast.

Studies of ancient peoples of the Manchuria region have, of course, referred to those peoples as nationalities (minzu), and especially since the 1980s they have been more specifically dubbed minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu) of ancient China. History
studies have thus followed in the wake of state doctrine regarding minorities, but again this has commonly taken the form of fairly transparent slogans prefacing those studies and a degree of Han chauvinism that for the most part exists independent of state minority policy. Such comparatively loose rein was probably the result of the fact that most of the ancient peoples of the Northeast are said to have been long ago assimilated into the Han majority, their modern day descendents preserving no sense of independent identity among themselves. Indeed, the Manchus are today all but assimilated, as are most of the Mongols of the three northeastern provinces (though the Mongols of Inner Mongolia are another matter entirely).

There was, however, a latent discord lurking in the Chinese treatment of Koguryo as a state founded by one of the nationalities of ancient China since, as we have seen, that state and its people had been long integrated into the historiography of peninsular states, and the Koreans within the PRC borders, and especially those on the peninsula, had by no means lost their identities. On the contrary, during the time when Chinese nationalists were discovering the Chinese-ness of ancient non-Han states like Koguryo, a Korean nationalist identity was also beginning to surface, though it was not until after 1945 that such an identity could be freely asserted on the peninsula. As far as Chinese scholarship was concerned, Jin Yufu’s ambiguous treatment on the fate of the “Puyo nationality” (which allowed for a linkage between Koguryo and modern Koreans) could remain unadjusted as long as neither those Koreans within Chinese borders nor those outside rose to challenge the treatment of Koguryo in the new Chinese history. Except for some possible instances of irredentism expressed among Koreans of the Yanbian autonomous region in the late 1950s, the ethnic Koreans within China have been generally successful in avoiding friction with China’s new historiographic orthodoxy.

The incompatibility between the Chinese and Korean historiographies finally became manifest during a 1960 joint Chinese-North Korean archaeological project investigating ruins of the ancient state of Parhae (Bohai). The disagreement centered on the interpretation of the proper historiographical place of Parhae, the Chinese side claiming it as a Tang dependency and the Korean side maintaining that it should be viewed as an early Korean state. This conflict remains unresolved and is a useful demonstration of the inherent incompatibilities between the Chinese and Korean interpretations of the history of southern Manchuria. The rift between the Chinese and North Korean scholarly communities resulted in a long-term unwillingness to engage in similar joint projects (Pak 1999). However, while Chinese scholarship began in the 1960s increasingly to refer to Parhae as a Tang dependency, the potential for Chinese-Korean discord regarding Koguryo does not seem to have resulted in a more cautious treatment of Koguryo in Chinese academic journals until the 1990s.

An analysis of Koguryo-related articles in Chinese academic journals since 1950 reveals an interesting phenomenon. Between 1950 and 1982 the majority of articles on Koguryo in history and archaeology journals make no attempt to address the question of Koguryo’s place in Chinese historiography, while a few name Koguryo as an ancient nationality (gulao minzu) or minority nationality (shaoshu minzu) of China, and slightly more associate Koguryo with Korean history or at least suggest its independence of China. From 1983 to 1992 most authors are again vague on the subject of Koguryo’s affiliation with China, but the number of those who treat it explicitly as a Chinese nationality far outnumber those who associate it with Korea. Beginning in 1993, however, a sharply increasing number of articles clearly refer to Koguryo as a Chinese nationality, while those
articles that remain vague on the matter become noticeably fewer in number. This trend toward specific mention of Koguryo’s Chinese affiliation appears to peak in 1997, when the number of articles that address the issue far outnumber those that do not, and those that associate Koguryo with Korea are negligible in number. Significantly, of those authors since 1993 who describe Koguryo specifically as a nationality of ancient China, the majority make this statement very clearly and prominently at the beginning of the article. This widespread concern since 1993 with the explicit and prominent identification of Koguryo with ancient China represents a rather sudden development, but what could have provoked such a reaction?

A 1994 article by the historian Sun Jinji provides a partial answer to this question. During an international conference on Koguryo held in 1993 at the town of Ji’an (the site of an early Koguryo capital), a North Korean delegation headed by historian Pak Sihyong criticized the Chinese historiographical treatment of Koguryo and argued that Koguryo had long been viewed by both Koreans and Chinese as a Korean state and people (Sun 1994). Pak accused the Chinese historians of conceiving of ancient China in terms of the territorial bounds of the modern Chinese state, which, he claims, is a view unsupported by historical evidence. Sun condemns this criticism as unwarranted, and proceeds to cite historical precedents in support of the present Chinese position. Sun specifically cites Jin Yufu’s statement that the Puyo nationality, including Koguryo, was a component of the ancient Chinese nation, but he ignores Jin’s equally clear statement that the Puyo nationality developed into the Korean nationality. Sun’s arguments are defensive, drawn primarily from the historiographical model set forth by Jin Yufu, and they illustrate the deficiencies inherent in the Republican period nationalist argument we have examined above.

While the 1993 North Korean challenge to the Chinese historiographical argument seems to have provided significant provocation for the increased attention paid to Koguryo in Chinese academic journals, this was not the only source of provocation. Until 1992 South Korean nationalism had little if any affect on the Chinese treatment of Koguryo in history, but almost immediately after Seoul and Beijing normalized relations in that year South Korean tourists and scholars began to visit the sites of Koguryo ruins in northeast China. By the mid-1990s the number of South Koreans visiting the Northeast had increased significantly, and some of them, perhaps unintentionally, provoked Chinese scholars and authorities with displays of nationalistic enthusiasm. Such acts included the almost militaristic behavior encouraged by some South Korean tourist agencies like the Damul Group (Glain 1995), as well as acts of piety demonstrated before altars placed in front of some Koguryo royal tombs. Perhaps more galling to Chinese scholars was the fact that eager South Korean tourists and scholars were gaining access to Koguryo archaeological remains, including tombs with wall murals, and producing high quality publications that far surpass anything available to Chinese scholars, who consider those remains proprietary material. By 1995 such provocations resulted in stringent measures intended to restrict access to Koguryo archaeological remains in the provinces of Liaoning and Jilin (Byington 2000), and they undoubtedly contributed significantly to the increasingly defensive stance assumed by some Chinese scholars with regard to the nature of Koguryo’s relationship with China.

*Nationalism and the Historiography Debate*
The Chinese scholars involved in the debate on Koguryo historiography, who were building upon the conceptual framework laid down by Jin Yufu, found their positions difficult to defend. To refute the Korean position, they were faced with two problems: first, demonstrating that Koguryo was in fact an integral part of an ancient Chinese nation; and second, denying any possibility of continuity between Koguryo and modern Korea. Sun Jinji addresses the first problem by maintaining that Koguryo was established on territories that had already been settled by Han China and that Koguryo kings acknowledged their place within the Chinese nation by accepting investiture from the Chinese emperor. To deny the Korean claim to Koguryo’s heritage, Sun points out that after the fall of Koguryo, more Koguryo survivors went to Tang China than to Silla, and he argues that the modern Korean states are the political descendants of Silla rather than Koguryo (Sun 1994). Such arguments illustrate the weakness of the historiographical model bequeathed by Jin Yufu, who, we recall, provided no rigorous justification for the inclusion of Koguryo in the imagined Chinese nation and left open the possibility of a link between the Puyo “nationality” and modern Koreans. Jin’s ambiguous treatment of Paekche in this regard is a conspicuous flaw in his historiographical model.

In a book published in 1998 the historian Zhang Bo quan tackled these problems using a variation on Jin Yufu’s model (Zhang and Wei 1998). In a verbose and intricate argument Zhang establishes a revised framework that draws substantially from Jin Yufu as well as Marxist historical theory. Like Sun Jinji, he denies charges that the modern conception of an ancient Chinese nation was determined by the territorial extent of modern China. Further, he declares that it is necessary to distinguish between the nationality and the state, for state borders are not drawn according to the distribution of nationalities. Again like Sun, Zhang maintains that Koguryo belonged to the Chinese nation by virtue of its having been established within the territories of China’s commanderies and by its rulers’ acceptance of investiture. In this respect, Zhang claims, Koguryo differed from Paekche and Silla (14–15). While Zhang acknowledges that Paekche and Koguryo were established by the same nationality, he specifically excludes Paekche from the Chinese nation, though he does not provide an explanation for this puzzling assertion (24). Zhang thus echoes Sun Jinji’s argument for the inclusion of Koguryo in the Chinese nation, and he attempts, rather unsuccessfully, to clear away the Paekche problem that Jin Yufu left unresolved.

To deny the Koreans a link to Koguryo, Zhang revised Jin Yufu’s descent lineage model. Like Jin, Zhang describes four nationality lineages in the ancient Northeast. Though he refers to them as linguistically determined descent groups, they are effectively the same as Jin’s nationality lineages (19–24). The four are the Han, Sushen, Yemaek, and the Donghu. Zhang’s Yemaek lineage is conceptually identical to Jin’s Puyo lineage, with the important exception that Paekche is left out of Zhang’s arrangement. Another significant adjustment to Jin’s model is that the Yemaek lineage is extinguished with the fall of Koguryo. Its populations being assimilated into the other Chinese nationalities, leaving no possibility for a connection with modern Koreans (15, 20–21). Both Zhang and Sun maintain that the peninsular states, including Koryo, Choson, and the modern Koreas, were derived from Silla and Paekche, while Koguryo provided no significant contribution to Korean culture.

Such arguments do not hold up well under scrutiny. Zhang apparently introduced the notion of nationalities spread across state borders in order to justify the exclusion of Paekche from the Chinese nation even though it had sprung from the same nationality as
had Koguryo. But if the criteria for Koguryo’s inclusion as part of China are its having been established on territory previously governed by Han commanderies and its acceptance of formal investiture, it is difficult to understand Zhang’s exclusion of Paekche, which was established in the former territory of the Daifang commandery and whose kings accepted investiture at least as often as did those of Koguryo. An extension of this argument can also be made to apply to Silla, yet Zhang, without explanation, explicitly excludes Paekche and Silla from his conception of ancient China and instead identifies them as the forebears of the modern Korean states. Unless modern state borders are a concern in Zhang’s definition (despite his assertions to the contrary), there is no logic in the inclusion of Koguryo and the exclusion of Paekche and Silla based upon the stated criteria.

The problem, of course, lies in the insistence on conceiving of ancient China, characterized by a soft, graded, and fluid periphery, in terms of a modern multi-nation-state with a rigid, sharp, and permanent periphery. Another way of expressing this ill fit is to describe it as imposing the new Nationalist state model upon the Culturalist tradition of the pre-modern past. On one level such an attempt to redefine the pre-modern state might seem practicable (if inaccurate), since one could simply conceive of the larger Chinese tributary network as encompassing a kind of super-state, inclusive of outer tributary states that were not directly governed by the Chinese emperor. Unfortunately, this idealized tribute system, to the extent that it ever existed at all, was far too fluid and complex a system to be represented as a rigidly bound polity of any kind. Nevertheless, Zhang Boquan attempts to account for the political inclusion of tributary states in the Chinese nation by invoking the concept of a duel system of government, with an internal mode for the central territorial administration, and an external mode for regions like Koguryo that were entirely autonomous (that is, for states over which the Chinese emperor could exercise no direct control). Zhang appears to have had the current policy for governing autonomous regions in mind when he formulated his model, and he even draws terminology directly from the 1982 constitution and the 1984 Minority Region Autonomy Law when he states that ancient China from the Qin period onward had been “a unitary multinational state” (Zhang and Wei 1998, 19). Ultimately, however, Zhang’s model fails in the Northeast because, as we have seen, it cannot as stated simultaneously justify the inclusion of Koguryo and the exclusion of Paekche and Silla.

Any model that attempts conceptually to force pre-modern Chinese states and their tributaries into a rigidly bound, unitary polity is probably doomed to failure for reasons already discussed. The historical models developed by Jin Yufu and his successors might have been allowed to remain quietly as unelaborated, abstracted, and optimistic portrayals of an idealized Chinese Northeast if those models had not run afoul of Korean historiographical tradition. With both Chinese and Korean nationalists laying claim to Koguryo’s heritage, however, it is unlikely that any historical model will satisfy both parties (to say nothing of satisfying historical accuracy). Perhaps the Chinese model that comes closest to accommodating Korean concerns is that proposed in 1981 by the scholar of historical geography, Tan Qixiang, who proposed that Koguryo and its territories were part of China while its capital was located north of the Yalu, but it and its territories lay outside of China after its capital was moved to P’yongyang in 427 (Tan 1991, 38). This represents nothing more than a compromise, of course, and fails to solve the root problem.
One may ask why so many scholars persist in denying the possibility that parts of ancient Manchuria might once have lain beyond China’s reach. I suggest here only two of many possible explanations for this persistence. First, states in East Asia and elsewhere in the world, both modern and pre-modern, have frequently appealed to historical precedent to justify their claims to the lands that they occupy. Modern China is no different?the People’s Republic of China therefore claims the territories of the Northeast by virtue of those territories’ having always been Chinese, even if history must be bent to prove the claim. Such declarations have been most emphatic when the state is confronted with a challenge, which brings us to the second explanation for the Chinese position—protection of territorial integrity. Given the near fragmentation of imperial China at the end of the nineteenth century, the disunity of the Warlord Period in the early years of the Republic, and especially the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the border conflicts between the Soviets and the PRC, it is not surprising that some Chinese scholars seem particularly sensitive to perceived challenges to the territorial integrity of their state.

I will close this discussion by pointing out that Koguryo–related scholarship in China during the past decade has not become moribund due to the preoccupation of some scholars with the historiography debate. Not all scholars of the Northeast prefer to dwell on historiographical problems, and most of them produce valuable scholarship without more than a passing concern for the debates discussed above. However, there is among many Chinese scholars of the Northeast an increasing wariness toward non–Chinese, especially Koreans, who show an interest in Koguryo history and archaeology (Byington 2000). Such suspicions tend to obstruct productive scholarship and discourage international participation in Koguryo–related studies in China. Obstructions of this kind are likely to continue in the coming years, though the future of Koguryo studies in China depends to an extent on whether Chinese scholars continue to perceive Korean nationalism as a potential threat to its territorial sovereignty (in the political and academic senses). Increased awareness among non–Chinese scholars of Chinese sensitivities in this regard will help to alleviate misunderstandings and may even allow for more active and productive scholarly exchanges across borders.

Glossary

Agui 阿桂

baizhong 白種

bu 部

Chaoxian minzu 朝鮮民族
Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石

Dongbei 東北

Dongbei shigang 東北史綱

Dongbei tongshi 東北通史

Donghu 東胡

Fu Sinian 傅斯年

Gu Jiegang 顧?剛

gulao minzu 古老民族

guojia 國家

guoshi 國史

haedong samguk 海東三國

Hanzu 漢族

huangzhong 黃種

Jin Yufu 金毓? 

Jizi (Kija) 箕子

Kang Youwei 康有?

Li Ji 李濟

Liang Qichao 梁?超

Lu Simian 呂思勉

Maek 蛮

Manzhou yuanliu kao 滿洲源流考

Manzu 滿族

miezhong 滅種

minzu 民族
Puyo 夫餘
ronghe 融合
Samguk sagi 三國史記
Samhan 三韓
shaoshu minzu 少數民族
So Hui 徐熙
Sun Jinji 孫進己
Sun Yat-sen 孫中山
Sushen 肅革
Tan Qixiang 譚其鑿
tonghua 同化
toyoshi 東洋史
Wang Tongling 王桐齡
wuzu gonghe 五族共和
Xiao Hengde 蕭恒德
Yan Fu 嚴復
Yemaek 濊貊
Yi-Hua dongxi shuo 夷華東西說
Yu Minzhong 于敏中
Zhang Binglin 章炳麟
Zhang Boquan 張博泉
zhengfeng yundong 整風運動
Zhongguo minzu shi 中國民族史
zhonghua minzu 中華民族
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(January): 97–130.

